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Russian Literature in the Christian Context 
Boris Paramonov 
 
Preliminary Remarks 
In examining Russia’s cultural history one encounters an incontestable 
fact: the literary nature of its spirituality. At the same time, Russian 
literature is distinguished by its high caliber. If one examines Russia’s 
cultural significance in the context of the Western world, or generally 
attempts to evaluate the nation’s achievements on a Western European 
scale, one finds that Russian literature stands out with particular 
distinction. The West places Leo Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky on a par with 
Shakespeare, while Chekhov’s plays enjoy a popularity comparable with 
the Bard’s in the sheer number of theatrical performances, even in 
England, where Chekhov’s Western renown initially blossomed. Even 
second-rate Russian writers, such as Maxim Gorky, are remembered and 
cherished in the West to this day; today’s Russian would be surprised to 
learn that his play The Summer People -- a work utterly forgotten in 
Russia itself--was being staged on Broadway. This is not simply a matter 
of aesthetic admiration, of purely intellectual homage which Westerners 
pay to Russian literary culture; it is possible to observe Russian 
literature’s direct, “real life” influence on certain Western phenomena, a 
sociological effect. The emergence of a Western intelligentsia in the 
specifically Russian sense of the word followed these same Russian 
models. Interestingly enough, the aforementioned play by Gorky concerns 
the intelligentsia and its much-vaunted complex of “guilt before the 
people”--a theme quite familiar in the West today. Of course, such an 
influence would be impossible without some spiritual ground shared by 
Russia and the West, most readily characterized by Christianity. Russian 
literature was a Christian phenomenon, and this mutually influential 
interplay between Christianity and Russian culture will form the basis of 
my discussion. 
Before proceeding, however, I must make clear that I do not propose to 
explore Christianity as a Russian literary theme or the sundry variations 
on this theme throughout the course of Russian literature, although the 
history of Christian thematics is certainly rich, complex in its evolution, 
and quite significant. Yuri Lotman offers an example of such a study in his 
1991 work, “Russian Literature After Peter the Great and the Christian 
Tradition.” This outstanding scholar draws our attention to many 
fascinating thematic threads interwoven through the course of Russian 
cultural history -- for instance, he examines Russia’s conception of the 
writer, the poet as cultural hero, and finds it stemming directly from the 
religious tradition, tied to both oral and written culture and particularly to 
the calling of the Old Testament prophets. The original socialist 
propaganda disseminated in Russia was similarly imbued with religious 
fervor and imagery -- here the scholar points to the undeniable influence 
exerted by the St. Simon movement on early Russian socialists of 
Herzen’s circle, who joined the French philosopher in his hope to establish 
socialism as the new religion, or more precisely, a new incarnation of 
socially-oriented Christianity. Lotman draws the following conclusion about 
this connection: 
“As a result, we may note that cultural secularization has not penetrated 
to the deepest structural foundations of the national model, which were 
formed in previous centuries. A set of fundamental functions has been 
preserved, though the material bearers of these functions have 
changed.”1 
Once again, all of this is certainly quite fascinating, but the subject of my 
discussion lies elsewhere. I am concerned not so much with the history 
and evolution of Christian cultural themes in Russia as with the history 
and significance of the Christian personality type in a cultural as well as 
political context: the Christian personality type as a structuring factor of 
Russia’s place in the world, its “presence,” as Heidegger’s famous term da 
sein was recently translated into Russian. Russian cultural litero-centrism 
emerges as one of the essential elements of this structure. 
Literature as a Form of (Christian) Escapism 
A sort of organic link connects the Christian worldview with literary art. A 
Word-centered religion had to beget a Literature. It is no accident that 
philosophical observers, such as Spengler, liked to remark upon Russia’s 
John-ian Christianity (later we will amend this observation somewhat). 
Christianity could not help but exert a cultural influence over Russians, as 
it had, in fact, always influenced everyone it came into contact with to 
some degree; yet due to many of its peculiarities, Christianity was not an 
altogether creative cultural force. One might say more -- that it exerted a 
negative influence on certain aspects of the cultural process, that it 
emerged as a peculiarly nihilistic force. 
Having uttered this fateful word, one cannot help but hearken back to the 
thinker who turned this word into a memorable philosophy resonating 
throughout European culture -- Friedrich Nietzsche. This is what he wrote 
in “The Antichrist”: 
In a manner of speaking, we might call Jesus a ‘freethinker,’ for he 
dismissed everything solid and secure as inconsequential... Life as a 
concept -- no, as experience -- is in constant conflict with all the words, 
formulas, laws, dogmas, and symbols of faith within Him. He speaks only 
of the deepest innermost workings of man -- these he calls ‘life,’ or truth, 
or light, while everything else -- all of reality, nature, even language itself 
-- has value for Him only as symbol, as likeness. . . . Having never even 
heard of culture, He does not have to struggle against it. He does not 
reject it -- one might say the same about government, about society and 
order, labor, war. . . . He had no reason to reject the ‘world.’ He did not 
even suspect the existence of such a church-begotten concept as ‘the 
world.’2 
Essentially, this list enumerates the fixed points of Russian cultural (that 
is, literary) consciousness and the key characteristics of Russia’s spiritual 
worldview, which was formed under the direct influence of literature and 
which influenced writing, in turn. This is a metaphysical snapshot of that 
very Russian soul to which one might apply the ancient theologian’s 
aphorism, with some modification: “The Russian soul is Christian by 
nature.” 
Throughout Russia’s history, those aspects of social being, those 
dimensions of life listed by Nietzsche, had never been brought to the 
forefront or culturally sanctioned. Russian Christianity never sanctioned 
those conscious intentions which create a culture, objectified in cultural 
behavior and action. Russia was ruled if not by chaos, then by the mighty 
whims of government, which almost totally enslaved social life. 
Characteristically, this split and rupture found ideological sanction among 
Russian thinkers, who were the first to question the philosophical 
underpinnings of Russian history and Russia’s cultural specificity in 
general. The notorious theory of “government and land” was developed in 
greatest detail by one of the so-called Slavophiles, Konstantin Aksakov. 
Briefly, Slavophilia is the doctrine of Russia’s cultural specificity, 
introduced in the first half of the nineteenth century. The theory might be 
summarized by the following representative formula: 
“The Government has the unlimited right of action and law, the Land has 
full rights to opinion and words . . . the external truth lies with the 
Government, the internal truth lies with the Land; the Czar holds total 
power, while the people retain full freedom of life and spirit; the Czar is 
free to act and rule, while the people are free to speak their mind.”3 
Most vividly, this brings to mind the evangelical words about rendering 
unto Caesar what is Caesar’s. Russia as “the Land,” that is the non-
governmental body, or the soul, is relegated to a certain otherworldly, 
monastic type of existence, beyond earthly cares, save for those of basic 
survival. Essentially, the Slavophile “ Land ” bears a great resemblance to 
“Heaven.” The Russian people lead a holy life, and Russia is “holy” in its 
rural, popular aspect, not at all in terms of its government and social 
involvement. A real schism is proclaimed -- no longer a church schism, 
which took place in the seventeenth century, but a cultural schism 
splitting different ways of life. Yet this is a peaceful, harmonious schism, 
not so much a schism as a division of spheres of influence, a serene 
coexistence unburdened by government’s attempts to control the people’s 
inner life or by the people’s attempts to interfere in governmental cares 
and strife. Such a “pre-determined” harmony reigned in the time before 
Peter the Great, Slavophiles assert, until the great reformer disturbed it 
by trying to force Russia into the foreign patterns of Western European 
culture, which was by that time nearing the peak of its Enlightenment 
progression toward becoming a social, secularized culture. 
Switching from their party-line sociology (K. Aksakov) to an equally party-
line cultural philosophy, Slavophiles put forth theoretical concepts meant 
to prove, or at least to proclaim, the fundamental distinction between 
Russian “learning” (that is, cultural genotype) and that of Western Europe, 
with the former touted as the loftiest cultural model, of course. Here I 
must refer to an essential Slavophile text written by Ivan Kireevsky, “On 
the Character of the European Enlightenment and its Relation to the 
Enlightenment of Russia” (1852). Kireevsky draws upon the conceptual 
framework established by the French historian Giseau, who delineated 
three elements in Europe’s spiritual-political foundation: (1) the legacy of 
classical antiquity; (2) Christianity; and (3) the beginning of forced 
conquest and colonization in the establishment of Europe’s political 
structures. Kireevsky, in turn, states that among all of these elements, 
Russia absorbed only one -- Christianity, which was unburdened both by 
the rationalistic tradition of ancient philosophies and the political passions 
of struggles for power. This circumstance, Kireevsky asserts, is not a 
drawback, but rather an advantage in terms of Russian-Christian cultural 
evolution, for it allows the possibility of building a higher (that is, purely 
Christian) type of culture compared with that of Europe. Let us examine a 
corresponding passage from Kireevsky: 
“These three Western elements -- the Roman church, the learning of 
ancient Rome, and a state system grown out of violent conquest -- were 
totally foreign to ancient Russia. Having penetrated into Russia, 
Christianity did not encounter the enormous obstacles that it faced in 
Rome, Greece, and European lands saturated with Roman erudition. The 
Slavic world did not obstruct Christianity’s influence on the inner and 
social life of its people in the way that self-referential classical wisdom 
limited the West. . . . At the same time, fundamental principles of human 
rights and responsibilities, of man’s personal, familial, and communal 
relationships, were not implemented by force through the decree of 
warring tribes and classes. . . . having never suffered conquest, the 
Russian people evolved independently. Enemies plaguing the land never 
meddled in its internal development. Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, Germans, 
and other scourges sent by Providence could only retard Russia’s 
intellectual development, and indeed they did so, but they could not alter 
its inner, communal life.”4 
Russian culture was stalled in its self-contained beginnings by the 
interference of foreign cultural-political elements, most importantly by 
Peter’s Westernization. This forced halt to Russia’s organic development 
explains the country’s present cultural lag behind the West: the alien 
culture did not fully take root, while the native one was retarded, inhibited 
by outside forces. Yet here the question arises, which no honest 
Slavophile can avoid: Why, in those early, original times, before the 
onslaught of “scourges,” did Russia never give rise to any cultural models 
which could surpass those of its European contemporaries? 
The Russian Idea as Artistic Model 
Kireevsky does not duck away from this question, yet nor does he offer a 
convincing answer. In the same article, he writes: 
Here one can do nothing but hypothesize. Personally, I believe that 
Russia’s unique contribution to the world lay in the fullness and clarity of 
expression that Christian teaching found there, in the entire scope of the 
country’s social and private life. This was the source of Russia’s wisdom, 
but also the greatest source of danger to its development. The clarity of 
expression meshed so well with the spirit being expressed that it was easy 
to confuse their respective significance and revere the outward forms 
equally with their underlying meaning. . . . Already in the sixteenth 
century we see that reverence for formalities frequently supersedes 
reverence for the spirit . . . reverence for Russia’s tradition imperceptibly 
became reverence more for its outward forms than for its animating spirit. 
Hence that slant in Russian learning . . . which caused various schisms 
and eventually, due to its limited nature, caused a certain portion of 
thinking people to embrace the opposite extreme, striving toward alien 
forms and an alien spirit.5 
Apparently, these words reflect a well-known historical situation in 
seventeenth-century Russia--the church schism, triggered by the patriarch 
Nikon’s decision to bring Russian liturgy and ritual into accord with the 
Greek canon, which elicited rebellion among a great number of 
parishoners. This rebellion had far-reaching consequences, but we are not 
concerned with these at present. We must glean from Kireevsky’s words 
the idea that Russian spiritual life in the bosom of the Orthodox church 
took on a sort of ritualized piety (or alternately, a “day-to-day evangelical 
zeal”), which undoubtedly slowed Russian spiritual development and in 
large part created that Russian personality type characterized by its 
tendency to adhere to stagnant dogma and mindlessly obey norms 
imposed from on high; this type is alive to this day, even now impeding 
Russia’s Westernization in this modern, post-Communist stage of its 
history (this never hindered the proliferation of another, totally opposite 
archetype--the rebel-anarchist). This is all very significant, but once again 
does not tell the whole story. For our purposes, we must discern in 
Kireevsky’s words implicit evidence of the contemplative-artistic 
tendencies in the Russian soul, which almost fully predetermined the 
character of Russian “learning.” 
Essentially, one can view Slavophilia itself as a sort of creative intuition 
about Russia, an aesthetic phenomenon in and of itself -- this is the 
artistic vision of Russia, or its myth, or, to use the classic term, 
its idea. The Slavophiles constructed their image of Russia through 
aesthetic contemplation. To do this, one first had to divert Russia from the 
flow of time, remove it to an archaic past or, more precisely, to an eternal 
present -- mythical time. This is why contemporary opponents called 
Slavophilia “retrospective utopianism” or “an anti-historical movement” 
(Chaadaev and the historian Soloviev, respectively). And, having glimpsed 
this aesthetic character of Slavophile thought, both in method and in 
subject matter, one is not surprised to learn that the best description of 
this thought may be found in Schopenhauer! In the third book of The 
World as Will and Representation, we find the following: 
“But now, what kind of knowledge is it that considers what continues to 
exist outside and independently of all relations, but which alone is really 
essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which is 
subject to no change, and is therefore known with equal truth for all time, 
in a word, the Ideas that are the immediate an adequate objectivity of the 
thing-in-itself, of the will? It is art, the work of genius.”6 
And later: 
(I)t is also that blessedness of will-less perception which spreads so 
wonderful a charm over the past and the distant, and by a self-deception 
presents them to us in so flattering a light. For by our conjuring up in our 
minds days long past spent in a distant place, it is only the objects 
recalled by our imagination, not the subject of will, that carried around its 
incurable sorrows with it just as much then as it does now.7 
One needs not recall the details of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, with its 
fundamental definitions of will and perception, to see the applicability of 
his words to the Slavophiles and the image of Russia that they created. 
This product of artistic fantasy, which tears its object out of the flow of 
time and change in order to give it ideatic design, is sheer “perception,” 
outside the realm of active, history-making “will.” Thus one can construct, 
or reconstruct, or more precisely, stylize any cultural-historical reality. 
Scholars have already noted that the image of Russia formulated by 
Kireevsky or Aksakov recalls the image of medieval Europe created by 
German romantics such as Novalis.8 The methods of such creative 
stylization are secondary to the fact that, in Russia’s case, we encounter 
this kind of work as the main, most valuable product of cultural activity in 
the national context. These literary fantasies, “literary dreams,” as the 
critic Belinsky put it, are the most interesting product of Russian culture. 
Only one example corresponds with Slavophilia not only in method, but in 
content as wel l-- Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace. This most famous of 
Russian novels is a Slavophile declaration in which “war” and “peace,” 
Napoleon and Kutuzov, organic life and the inimical progress of world 
history play out the roles of Aksakov’s “government” and “land,” 
respectively. However, such thematic correspondence is rare -- more 
important is Slavophilia’s crucial role in the evolution of Russian literature. 
It constitutes literature’s methodology and, if you will, its genetic code. 
Christian Kenosis and Orthodox Nihilism 
The key element of this methodology lies in the Christian interpretation of 
Russian themes, which the Slavophiles expressed declaratively, openly, 
ideologically, and which became, in the greater context of Russian 
literature, a ubiquitous and inevitable subtext. Russian literature is a 
Christian literature even in its most openly atheistic examples. It was 
noted long ago that the Russian nihilists during the first “glasnost” and 
“perestroika”--the period of reform which took place in the 1860s -- with 
all of their political radicalism, philosophical materialism, and religious 
atheism, essentially presented a modification of the Christian cultural-
psychological type. Such was their most famous representative, Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky, who is best known in the West as the object of Nabokov’s 
simultaneously heroic and satirical characterization in The Gift. This quasi-
revolutionary’s entire life is really the life of a Christian martyr. 
Russian literature presents and sanctions the Christian worldview and 
ways of behavior as the only truly Russian narrative. Yet for all this, 
Christianity is understood, or rather, is instinctually presumed to be the 
same kind as Nietzsche described in his aforementioned work “The 
Antichrist.” Generally, the Christian worldview and behavior among 
Russians may be distinguished by that very quality that Nietzsche called 
nihilism. And one ought to recall that even the term “nihilism” was born in 
Russia; Nietzsche derived it from the land of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, 
and his ruminations on these figures set the manifest tone for “The 
Antichrist.” 
This is but one, typical if not yet exhaustive, example of such 
correspondence. Nietzsche asserts that the concepts of “heroism” and 
“genius” are completely foreign to the Christian mind and heart. Dmitri 
Merezhkovsky, writing about Russian literature as revolt against the West, 
aimed specifically at the great Westernizer, Peter, and his troubadour, 
Pushkin, offers the following summary: 
“After Pushkin, all of Russian literature will be a democratic, Gallilean 
uprising against the giant who ‘reared up Russia before the abyss.’ All of 
the great Russian writers -- not only the obvious mystics, like Gogol, 
Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, but even Turgenev and Goncharov -- are 
outwardly Westerners, but in truth enemies of culture. They beckon 
Russia away from its sole hero and enigmatic darling, Pushkin, the 
eternally lonesome giant stranded on a frozen chunk of Finnish granite -- 
they will beckon Russia back toward the maternal bosom of the land, 
warmed by the Russian sun, toward humility before God, toward the 
heartfelt simplicity of a ploughman, the cozy chambers of old-world 
gentry, to the wild cliffs above their own native Volga, the hush of 
‘gentry’s nests,’ to the Idiot’s seraphic smile, to the blissful ‘non-doing’ of 
Yasnaia Poliana--and every single one of them, unwittingly perhaps, will 
take up this challenge of the humble to the mighty, that blasphemous cry 
of the indignant masses: ‘Enough, you marvelous builder! Hold up!’”9 
Here the word “non-doing” is quite significant, referring as it does not only 
to Tolstoy, but also to his inspiration, Schopenhauer, who admired Indian 
philosophy and Buddhism and introduced them into European 
philosophical discourse and perception. Russians perceived Christianity in 
the Buddhist sense, as a philosophy and religion of non-doing. In this 
conception, Christianity fueled the Russian revolt against “heroic” culture, 
an active interference in world events, any sort of reshuffling or perfecting 
of circumstance. Literature became that form of cultural activity which --
while undoubtedly cultural -- could simultaneously provide a means of 
avoiding culture in the aforementioned sense of an active relation to 
being. Literature allowed for the possibility of maintaining an observant, 
reflective relation to the world, cultivating a sort of passive contemplation, 
avoiding worldly travails, which are always essentially cultural. 
In this Russian sense, culture is seen as falsehood, an artificial 
superstructure over the elemental truth of being -- the “peasant,” or 
Christian, way of life (in Russian the two words stem from the same root). 
In Christian theological terminology, this worldview, this very narrative is 
called “kenosis,” or “descent”: Christ’s descent to earth as the incarnation 
of God, that is, God’s decision to “lower” his ontological status to that of 
mankind, out of love. Russians follow this example not only in their 
literature, but elsewhere as well. In this sense Russian history may be 
seen as the imitation of Christ,Imitatio Cristi. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Russian poet and cultural philosopher 
Viacheslav Ivanov wrote: 
The fundamental trait of our national character is the pathos of 
divestment, a thirst to strip away all raiment and rich attire, tear off all 
masks and decoration from the naked truth of things. Many of our virtues 
and strengths are tied to this trait, along with many of our weaknesses, 
evasions, threats, and failures. . . . The soul, instinctually hungering for 
the unconditional, instinctually ridding itself of the conditional, the 
artificial, is a noble savage, extravagantly wide and raging...eventually it 
devalues and debases the individual human face. . . . leading to all the 
suicidal urges of the intoxicated soul, to all manner of theoretical and 
practical nihilism. This love of the descent, evident in all of these images 
of ‘casting-off’ . . . this love, which lies in opposition to the tireless will to 
ascension . . . constitutes a distinguishing peculiarity of our national 
psychology.10 
These words largely express the artistic theory and life of Leo Tolstoy, 
who said of Napoleon: “there is no greatness where there is no simplicity, 
goodness, and truth.” But this formula is not so much profound as he is 
typical--a typical Russian, a kenotic Christian. Such construction of the 
soul harbors danger as well--the potential for cultural pogrom, which in 
fact occurred in Russia when it stepped onto the Bolshevik path in 1917. 
‘Cultural Pogrom’ means not only censorship, but also, for instance, 
economic ruin for the sake of the socialist experiment. Russian literature 
did not experience any significant decline during the Bolshevik years, and 
yielded several works of the highest caliber. Russia’s anticultural nihilism 
did not so much threaten spiritual culture as it threatened material life, in 
the widest sense, everything from the economy to law and governmental 
organization, generally theworld to which Nietzsche referred as something 
utterly foreign to the Christian psychological makeup. 
At the peak of Russia’s ruin, in January of 1918, Vasilii Rozanov wrote in a 
piece aptly titled “The Apocalypse of Our Time”: 
There is no doubt that the root of all that is happening now lies in the 
gaping holes left in Christianity’s wake among all the European people, 
including Russians. Everything tumbles into this abyss: thrones, social 
classes, labor, wealth . . . all is lost, everyone and everything perish. All of 
it tumbles into the void of the soul, which has lost its ancient mainstay.11 
This unexpected exchange between two minds belonging to totally 
different cultural orbits is remarkable; yet Nietzsche and Rozanov were 
united by a common theme -- Christianity’s Russian implications (once 
again, “The Antichrist” reveals a careful reading of Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky). 
Christianity and Bolshevism 
Thus, Christian “non-doing” can turn extremely active, but in a negative, 
destructive way. Such was Russian Bolshevism, which presents a 
modification of the Christian phenomenon (one must specify its 
particular Russian form here). 
Nikolai Berdiaev termed this theme “apocalypse and nihilism.” The 
corresponding discussion is presented in his book, The Sources and 
Meaning of Russian Communism (1937). For example: 
Nihilism is a characteristically Russian phenomenon, unknown to Western 
Europe in this form. . . . Russian nihilism rejected God, spirit, soul, all 
manner of norms and higher values. Nonetheless, nihilism must be viewed 
as a religious phenomenon. It grew out of the spiritual soil of Orthodoxy, 
and it could only take root in a soul which was formed in the Orthodox 
tradition. This is Orthodox asceticism turned inside-out, asceticism without 
grace. If one examines Russian nihilism deeply and honestly, one finds the 
Orthodox rejection of the world, a sense that the world is mired in evil, 
bearing witness to the sinful nature of all the wealth and luxuries of life, 
any creative excess in art and thought. . . . 
Nihilism is the opposite of Russian apocalyptic thought. It rebels against 
the falsehoods of history, the lies of civilization; it demands the end of 
history and the beginning of a totally new, a-historical or super-historical 
life. Nihilism demands nakedness, a stripping away of all cultural 
trappings, annihilation of all historical traditions, emancipation of the 
natural man, who will be chained no longer. . . . 
This deformed version of nihilism reflected yet another aspect of the 
Russian Orthodox religious type -- its indecision regarding the problem of 
culture. Ascetic Orthodoxy doubted culture’s justification and tended to 
see sin in cultural endeavor. This could be seen in the struggles and 
uncertainties suffered by the great Russian writers with regard to their 
literary creation. Religious, moral, and social doubt in the justification of 
culture is a characteristically Russian motif.12 
We might note that Berdiaev, when speaking of the religious roots of this 
Russian phenomenon -- nihilism -- never uses the term “Christian,” but 
rather always says “Orthodox.” Consequently, the Russian themes we 
discuss should be linked not with Christianity as such, but with its Russian 
historical modification, Russian Orthodoxy. This is both true and 
misleading .Russian Orthodox Christianity was Christianity “as such,” since 
Christianity never encountered a hostile cultural context in Russia. Ivan 
Kireevsky discussed this in the aforementioned article: Russian 
Christianity existed in primordial purity, and the absence of two other 
Western European cultural progenitors--the legacy of classical antiquity 
and conquest of foreign lands -- were to Russia’s advantage, served as a 
plus when all historical experience points to the opposite interpretation -- 
that the meaning of any absence is negative. 
Here I must underscore my fundamental thesis: Christianity cannot be the 
monopolizing, exclusive, monistic culturally creative factor. It acts 
exclusively and is, simply speaking, beneficial in any somewhat 
complementary situation. Thus, in conjunction with ancient classical 
culture it sparked a mighty impulse toward new, unprecedented cultural 
growth. But on bare -- “pure,” “virginal” -- ground it cannot yield anything 
positive. Christianity cannot, or rather should not be a cultural totality. Yet 
this is the case in Russia. Taken out of any positive cultural context, 
Christianity can only form that worldview which Berdiaev termed 
apocalyptic nihilism. On barren soil, Christianity inspires and religiously 
sanctions this bareness and emptiness, justifies “non-doing” as God’s own 
work. In Christianity, culture is a stone rejected by the builders. 
As has already been stated, however, one should not think that any sort 
of spontaneous activity is foreign to Christianity. It carries a powerful 
ethical impulse, a directive toward obligation which breeds all sorts of 
activity. Yet if Christianity considers the world itself to be unnecessary, 
mired in sin, then Christian energy, outside the cultural sphere which 
derails its lines of power, takes on the character of a negative impulse--
that selfsame nihilism. Christianity is anarchical and antisocial; Jesus 
himself was an anarchist, a “hippie” spotted already by Nietzsche. Jesus’ 
Christianity is not culture, not cultural potential, but anti-culture, 
counterculture. Of course, I’m speaking only of the Teacher here, not of 
the teaching and practice that grew up around and after him. The polar 
opposition of Christ and the Church is indisputable because the Church is, 
above all, a social practice, born in the context of cultural necessity, 
susceptible to cultural suggestion. More simply stated, the Church is 
necessarily conservative, while Christ is a total liberal, that is, an 
anarchist, a countercultural rebel. What the Christian church, in any of its 
denominations, has made of Christ is, of course, a cultural feat -- but it 
has little to do with Christ himself. The Church is Martha, not Mary. 
Western Christianity was hellenized in Catholicism and rationalized in 
Protestantism; in Russia, it created the Orthodox church as a harsh, 
repressive power. In this sense one might say that the Christian church is 
an oxymoron, that the church does not know Christ, and neither does 
culture. 
All but one. The only truly Christian culture is Russian literary culture. 
Replacing action with observation and doing with words, this culture 
condemns itself if not to self-destruction, then to a perpetual state of 
unrealized and unrealizable hope, in a mood of social wistfulness, abstract 
-- that is, single-minded and ineffectual--idealism. Reality is replaced by a 
project of words. One such project in Russia was Communism. In this 
sense, Communism is totally literary. And it stands repeating that with all 
of its repressive censorship, Communism did not kill off Russian literature. 
One might say, in fact, that Communism assisted literature in self-
consciously reflecting on the Communist project. The apex of this self-
consciousness, “the moment of truth,” was Andrei Platonov’s 
novel Chevengur (1929), the ultimate creation of Russian literature, 
its telos. This book was the juncture, deciding whether Russian literature 
would descend into hell or arise into eternity. Eternity is, in fact, the 
Russian hell, in imitation of heaven revisited. Chevengur is a town which 
witnesses the construction of the purest, most ultimate form of 
communism. And this communism turns out to be the end, the end of 
everything: history, labor, family, love, that free-fall into nothingness 
which Rozanov described in January of 1918. This is a monastery outside 
the surrounding social field, outside the world of peasants, ploughmen, 
and church tithes. Of course it cannot exist; it is doomed. But Chevengur’s 
communists hurry to die in their eagerness to experience the bliss of the 
afterlife. No other literary text ever linked communism and Christianity so 
exactly and indelibly. The very “seamlessness” of this construction 
demonstrates the truth of the union, the congruence of the two 
beginnings, their essentially identical nature. 
Platonov himself offers no Christian explications in this novel; Christianity 
is the subtext. However, there are many such correspondences in the 
body of Russian literature. The theme of Christianity as motivation for 
looming, imminent revolution has always been central to the Russian 
cultural discourse. One significant example is an episode in the so-called 
Russian religious-cultural renaissance at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The Christian religious renaissance was aimed equally at the 
stagnant dogmas and servile practices of the Orthodox church and at the 
culturally desiccating worldview presented by the Russian atheist 
intelligentsia, which drained the soul in deserts of dogmatic materialism 
and trite positivism. Russia’s liberation had to be religiously justified and 
sanctioned--this was perhaps the renaissance’s most vital cultural 
message. Foreshadowing this mood, or, one might say, ideology, was a 
speech given by the most well-known Russian philosopher of the time, 
Vladimir Soloviev, entitled “On the Decline of the Medieval Worldview”; 
the philosopher stated that historical progress, so far as one could speak 
of it (and at the time one could, indeed), was moving in the direction of 
Christian values, but was being carried out by the godless rather than 
churchmen, revolutionaries rather than traditionalists. Hence came the 
idea most thoroughly developed from the turn of the century onward by 
Dmitri Merezhkovsky, about the unconscious, inarticulated Christian 
character of the Russian revolution, the entire anti-czarist Russian 
liberation movement. Merezhkovsky insisted that all Russian 
revolutionaries, even the most extreme terrorists among them, were 
unconscious Christians. The intelligentsia’s duty was to bring Christian 
awareness to the revolutionary movement; then Russia would witness the 
coming of a new earth and a new heaven. The greatest poet of the early 
twentieth century, Alexander Blok, reflected Merezhkovsky’s influence 
(and not only Merezhkovsky’s; as previously stated, this was the air of the 
times) in his poem “The Twelve,” which heralded the October Bolshevik 
revolution and depicted Jesus Christ leading a twelve-man unit of the Red 
Guards (twelve also being the number of the apostles). The Red Guards 
were Bolshevik storm troopers, rather like the later Chinese Red Guards, 
and they were being lauded as the apostles of the new world. Blok wrote 
his poem in January of 1918, during the same days in which Rozanov 
wrote his text about the Christian void sucking Russia inside-out. These 
writings shared a plot, but differed in their conclusions; rather, not even 
so much in their conclusions as in the hopes nurtured by Blok. Yet only a 
year and a half later, in the summer of 1919, the poet wrote in his 
journal: “One cannot deny the Bolsheviks their uncanny ability to poison 
life and destroy individual people.”13 This admission summed up the 
Russian illusion about Christian values being realized through revolution -- 
in fact, the Russian illusion about Christianity in general, for Blok’s 
intuition served him well. Christ did indeed lead the Red Guard unit, led 
the “Red Guards’ charge against capital,” as Lenin later described the 
events of October, 1917. 
St. John’s Christianity or the Converted Criminal? 
These words, first penned by Rozanov, paint a clearer picture of Russia’s 
unique brand of Christianity, free from outside cultural influences. The key 
word here is “criminal.” Russian Christianity did not so much follow the 
spirit of St. John, as Spengler wrote, as it followed the spirit of that 
common criminal who hung on the cross next to Jesus and who was 
assured entrance to the heavenly kingdom by the Son of God. The biblical 
parable might best be expressed by a Russian saying: Without sin there is 
no atonement, and without atonement there is no salvation. Russian 
Christianity is a provocative religion, a school of sin and repentance. 
To clarify this admittedly paradoxical interpretation of Christianity, we 
must recall a phenomenon termed Christian Dionysianism. This is most 
easily understood through a fairly recent example -- the hippie movement 
-- or perhaps more concretely through Dennis Hopper’s role in the film 
“Easy Rider.” This film sharply illustrates the Christian subtext of the 
hippie movement, presenting Christians in their primal purity, one might 
say, in the form of drifters and publicans (though the latter play the role 
of drug-pushers in the film). Another example of Christian Dionysianism, 
sanctioned by Western cultural and historical precedent, was St. Francis of 
Assisi, a Christian saint, but also a wealthy youth who gave away his 
inheritance, squandered his father’s estate. 
One cannot fail to notice the grand gesture of renunciation in communism-
-one might call it the Great Renunciation. Despite its penchant for 
violence, uncharacteristic of Christianity (at least in its earliest versions), 
one cannot discredit a certain consciously demonic ideology in 
communism; it continues to pulse with the pathos of both ancient and 
contemporary prophets, such as Karl Marx. It is ecstatic, drunk with an 
ethical ideal, thirsting for immediate and all-encompassing goodness, a 
readiness to give out and share the inheritance. In a certain aspect this 
creates a mood of that very same Christian Dionysianism -- intoxication 
with goodwill, a relentless need for brotherhood. This is one of the key 
motives of Russian literature, which existed before and apart from 
communism, because it is a primal Christian, super-cultural and 
countercultural motive. Yet we hear this same note in communism, not 
only in its beginnings, but strangely enough, on its deathbed, as it exits 
the stage. It finds expression in the unforgettable events of Glasnost and 
Perestroika, when Gorbachev truly relinquished the estate, while Yeltsin 
concluded this rite by willingly, with no visible imperative, disbanding the 
Soviet Union, liquidating the internal Soviet empire with a stroke of his 
pen. 
Perhaps the keenest appraisal of these events was made by an American 
Catholic historian of Hungarian origin named John Lukacs in his book 
entitledThe End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern 
Age; his view addresses the heart of the matter by taking into account the 
Christian overtones and context: 
On the other hand, there is that strange and unexpected element in the 
Russian character: those conversions springing from a sense of guilt, a 
willingness to renounce one’s possessions, to give things away. Such 
conversions were exaggerated and mystified by Dostoyevsky in his 
feverish, heavily panting prose; but they exist nonetheless. There is not 
much softness in the German character--except for a sentimentality that 
may be false and cloying in some instances but also genuinely good-
hearted in others. Often there is an alteration of a hard, near-blind, 
barbaric cruelty with an unexpectedly charitable softness in the Russian 
character. The later is, alas, rare; but it occurs often within the same 
person. 
There are evidences of this in Gorbachev -- and, before him, in 
Khruschev. There is something very Russian -- stunning, unexpected, 
impractical -- in Khruschev’s decision in February 1956 to go before the 
entire Party Congress to detail Stalin’s crimes. Impractical: because it 
shook the entire leadership, and led to the Eastern European risings a few 
months later. A few subtle statements or references to Stalin’s extremes 
and errors would have done the job. Stunning: because the entire five-
hour speech was something like a confession. The theme was Stalin, but 
he was not the only one culpable. There was a touch of mea culpa in it on 
the part of this Ukranian peasant whose entire career had been in the 
service of Stalin; and yet there was no sense of calculation in that belated 
denial of his former master. Thirty years later Gorbachev, who had risen 
as Andropov’s man, close to the KGB: during the next six years he gave 
the empire away. He was not pressured to do that; it was not Ronald 
Reagan’s technological bluster that forced his hand, and while the Soviet 
economy and material conditions of the peoples of the Soviet Union in 
1985 were no better than before, they were not worse either. But 
Gorbachev was not only fully aware of, and deeply exercised by, the 
corruption of the Communist party. Beneath his more or less conscious 
dismantling of it was a sense of more than past mistakes; there was 
probably a Russian sense of guilt. Some sense of guilt may have been 
instrumental during the retreat of other great empires, but never in that 
way. Seldom -- perhaps never before in history--had anything like this 
occurred: the abandoning of almost all that had been won in a great war, 
of an entire sphere of interest, without external or internal threats, 
without a clear and present danger of material need. And it at least seems 
that the majority of the Russian people did not care much about giving up 
Eastern Europe, perhaps not even about letting many of the other 
‘republics’ of the Soviet Union go. This, too, is something rare. I think that 
to attribute all of this to mere materialism or to indifferent stupidity would 
be wrong. Yes, those elements exist; but that indifference to imperial 
possessions, indeed to the traditional territorial extent of one’s very state, 
may be a mark -- perhaps even one of the spiritual marks -- of a great 
people, after all.14 
Russian literature resembled this last gesture of the communist leaders: 
useless and wonderful, as useless and wonderful as Christianity itself. 
Christianity never created a culture in Russia, but it did teach the Russian 
certain “gestures” and “ways.” Among these gestures was Russian 
literature, which managed to make Dostoyevskian heroes even out of 
totalitarian warlords. 
Whatever negative observations one might make about Christianity, as 
Nietzsche did in Germany or Rozanov in Russia, one cannot deny its one 
truly universally historic achievement. Christianity posits the idea of 
personal identity as a metaphysical value and furthermore, as the subject 
of inalienable civic and political rights, the bearer of freedom. One of 
Russia’s beloved images of freedom is the bandit Stenka Razin, a sort of 
Robin Hood figure who remains in the collective national memory as a 
cherished hero. Stenka Razin and similar Russian heroes embody not so 
much freedom as “liberty” -- a crucial nuance in Russian psychology and 
culture. The metaphysical sublimation of this type is the aforementioned 
criminal who hung on the cross next to Jesus. This is the history of 
Christianity in Russia (though not of the Orthodox church, of course). 
Yet there was another, heterodox church in Russia--the church of Russian 
literature and its readers, who were as brilliant as the literature itself. The 
peculiarity of the Russian situation was that both types sometimes merged 
in a single individual -- the reader, as a man of letters, was the “criminal” 
-- a revolutionary, a nihilist, overthrower of tradition and propagator of 
robbery under the pseudonym of socialism. At the same time, the 
“criminal” displayed intellectual traits as a reader of learned books: such, 
for example, was Nestor Makhno, the eloquent anarchist partisan. 
In today’s Russia these types have been completely differentiated: the 
bandit has become a shining knight of primal wealth accumulation, akin to 
the American Robber Barons, and has lost all philanthropic resemblances 
to Robin Hood, while the intellectual reader not only was unable to tune 
into the process of Russia’s so-called “Westernization,” but seems to be 
losing interest in literature, which never did teach him how to live. If this 
disintegration of Russian life continues along these lines into the future, 
one will be able to speak of positive perspectives on Russia only with 
fingers crossed. 
A Thematic Excursion into the History of Russian Literature 
The preceding brief sketch, describing Russian literature in its structural 
moments as a cultural modification of Christianity (or more precisely, 
primal Christian consciousness) will be augmented by another brief 
sketch, or summation, of its narratives, protagonists, and themes. Even 
this deliberately synoptic listing will make plain the unity of this 
literature’s cultural and religious arrangement throughout the long course 
of Russian history and despite all the recent catastrophic upheavals. At 
the same time, literature itself experienced many changes, evolved to 
become almost unrecognizable, if we agree to use the more general 
definition of the Russian written and oral tradition. Yet even the most 
significant mutations of Russian history -- Peter’s reforms, the Bolshevik 
revolution -- failed to introduce anything fundamentally new into the 
thematics, attitude, and worldview of Russian literature. If even the latest 
Soviet leaders retain ancient Russo-Christian patterns in their responses 
to the world -- as was, for example, Gorbachev’s political strategy of 
“relinquishing the estate” in a purely Christian manner -- then what can 
one say about such a relatively ideal construction as the Russian literary 
hero? Russian literature lives on in that same Platonic sphere, 
engendering real-life models -- and these models are born the same, all 
variations on the same Russian Christian type. 
It is customary to begin the history of Russian literary heroes with the 
princes Boris and Gleb--heroes of the early hagiographic period of Kievan 
literature. These real historical figures were young princes who were killed 
in a dynastic conflict by their brother Sviatopol the Damned. They are also 
the first saints canonized by the Russian Orthodox church. These heroes 
radiate a sacrificial quality, readiness to suffer, the ability to endure 
undeserved torments: genuine Christian traits, as they were imprinted 
and confirmed in the Orthodox consciousness and in the system of 
Christian values. The hagiography of Boris and Gleb reveals one detail 
especially precious to the modern researcher familiar with contemporary 
techniques of textual and situational analysis: one of the brothers had a 
homosexual lover, a certain “ugrin” (that is, Hungarian) named Georgi, 
and died together with him, in his embrace. A psychoanalytical approach 
to the narrative highlights this specifically Christian detail -- if we bear in 
mind the traditional view of Jesus as a virgin, as the archetype of 
androgyny, even. After Vasilii Rozanov’s works (The Metaphysics of 
Christianity and People of the Moonlight) we cannot disregard this 
narrative. The hagiography of Boris and Gleb already reveals perhaps the 
defining characteristic of almost every subsequent Russian literary hero, 
and perhaps every heroic historical figure as well: a (Christian) resistance 
to the world as the only possible expression of a kind of passive heroism. 
This oxymoron presents itself in Russian narratives and in the nature of 
Russian people as the heroic sacrificial death, or a refusal to fight even at 
the price of death (to say nothing of unhappiness). 
Let us examine the best-known pre-Peter I literary hero (and writer), the 
archpriest Avvakum, author of his own hagiography, widely considered the 
literary master of the period before Peter’s reforms. Avvakum actively 
participated in the church schism of the mid-seventeenth century, 
defending the “old piety,” opposing the church reforms of Patriarch Nikon, 
and supporting czar Alexei Mikhailovich, father of the future emperor, 
Peter the Great. Avvakum’s life truly was heroic, marked by tremendous 
activity in the pursuit of certain church and political goals. Among Western 
figures he most resembles Savonarola, whose death at the stake he also 
shared. Yet, at the same time, reading his hagiography one cannot help 
but remark upon another Western European resemblance -- this is a 
Russian Jean-Jacques Rousseau! The key to their similarity is masochism. 
This has already been noted in scholarly literature; the American Slavic 
scholar and psychoanalyst Daniel Rancour-Laferriere remarks upon 
Avvakum’s masochism as an archetypal Russian trait in his book, The 
Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of 
Suffering (1995).15 Avvakum served as a lightning rod, drawing in all of 
the century’s storms. The most superficial familiarity with contemporary 
psychology makes plain the indubitably masochistic, provocative aspects 
of this behavior. One is left with the impression that Avvakum has no 
desire to win his battle -- his only desire is to suffer some. 
Masochistic traits appear in the archetypal Russian character three 
centuries after Avvakum in one of Ivan Bunin’s tales. Here we find a lowly 
variation on Avvakum’s character in the form of Shasha, a peasant’s son 
who provokes people to beat him--first his father, the rich, loutish Roman, 
then the soldier who is married to Shasha’s mistress. The tale is 
characteristically titled “I Keep Silent,” in a grotesque expression of 
Russia’s oft-praised sacrificial meekness. 
On the village’s big open market day, Shasha regularly calls the soldier 
out to fight, with the aim of being beaten: 
Amid the din and clamor, the mad clanging of the whirling carousel and 
the ecstatic, sham-sympathetic oohs and aahs of the parting crowd, the 
soldier stuns and bloodies Shasha with his first punch. Shasha . . . 
immediately hits the dirt as if dead, falls to be pounded by steel-heeled 
boots in his chest, his rumpled head, his nose, his eyes, already dimmed 
like a slaughtered sheep’s. Meanwhile, the people gape in wonder: what 
an odd, crazy person! He knew all along how this would turn out! Why did 
he put himself up to it? And in truth -- why? Why does he go on so 
insistently, day after day, emptying out his ruined house, striving to erase 
the last signs of what Roman’s wild genius had created, and endlessly 
craving insult, shame, and beatings?16 
Of course, Bunin’s Shasha is a grotesque degradation of the Christian 
archetype which was presented so miraculously and expressively by the 
larger-than-life figure of Avvakum, yet Shasha retains the structural and 
formative qualities of this type, the most important of these being the 
need to suffer as a way to attain Christian salvation. 
However, the main reservoir of compelling Christian character types lies in 
the classical Russian literature of the nineteenth century, among those 
protagonists who earned the epithet “extraneous people.” Their main trait 
presents itself as an inability to act in the most elementary, everyday 
situation: in sexual competition, not only against a rival for a woman’s 
love, but competition with the woman herself. Specifically, this narrative 
unfolds so that the literary protagonist turns out to be weaker than his 
beloved; thus, he willingly relinquishes her to another. The plot has many 
variations in Russian literature. 
For many years, if not centuries, the “extraneous people’s” behavior was 
explained away as the result of governmental oppression and societal 
repression in Russia, which would not allow its positive characters to 
blossom. In a psychoanalytic light such behavior takes on a completely 
different character. Yet there are other interpretations of this literary 
phenomenon besides the psychoanalytic one, which focus beyond its 
social dimensions. The most clever of these belongs to the literary 
formalist Victor Shklovsky, who has, in fact, commented extensively on 
the irrelevance of psychoanalysis to literature: 
I will write about ‘scouts’, for no one has written of them yet and their 
feelings might be hurt. When mating horses (which isn’t the most refined 
activity, but without it there would be no horses), often the mare 
experiences a defensive reflex, becoming nervous and refusing to mate. 
She may even kick the stallion. 
Now, a factory horse is not meant for romantic intrigues; his path must be 
strewn with roses, and only exhaustion puts a damper on his ardor. Thus, 
a half-grown stallion is selected to approach the mare; his soul is much 
more delicate. They flirt with one another, but as soon as they begin to 
reach an understanding (in a manner of speaking), the poor young stallion 
is dragged off by the neck and the real producer is brought back on the 
scene. 
The first stallion is called the scout. The scout’s task is a hard one, and 
they say some end up mad or suicidal. . . . 
The Russian intelligentsia has played the historical role of the scout. 
Yet even before, Russian literature was devoted to describing the trials 
and tribulations of these scouts. Writers described in great detail how their 
heroes failed to get what they strove for... Alas, even Leo Tolstoy’s 
characters in The Cossacks, War and Peace, and Anna Karenina, even 
these most beloved characters are scouts.17 
This theme may be illustrated beginning with the very first Russian 
classicist--Pushkin. His Evgenii Onegin presents the first significant, truly 
seminal model of the Russian literary plot: the woman emerges as man’s 
superior, defeating him in a sort of moral contest by showing a willingness 
and ability to love, while the male hero handles the situation inadequately. 
Essentially, Evgenii Onegin is the first “scout”; this protagonist rejects the 
woman who has fallen in love with him, only to realize that he loved her 
after all once she is married to another. In psychoanalysis, this sort of 
situation is termed “Kandavel’s motif.” 
To confirm this thesis, one has but to list the famous Russian novels of the 
nineteenth century, naming the characters who make up the couples and 
triangles of the aforementioned plot. This pattern applies to almost all of 
Russia’s nineteenth-century classic literature. A few examples: Rudin, 
Natalia, and Luzhin (Turgenev’s “Rudin”), Oblomov, Olga, and Stoltz 
(Goncharov’s “Oblomov”), Raisky, Vera, and Volokhov (“The Cliff,” also by 
Goncharov), Prince Andrei, Natasha, and Anatole Kuragin (later Pierre 
Bezukhov) in Tolstoy’s War and Peace. In this sense, the most expressive 
male character in Russian literature is Prince Myshkin in 
Dostoyevksy’s The Idiot, a deliberately Christlike figure, incapable of love 
by definition (“love” implying a certain elementary level of activity). 
To examine this plot as masochism in the narrow psychoanalytical sense, 
as does D. Rancour-Laferriere, means to simplify its cultural -- or anti-
cultural, or a-cultural -- meaning. This meaning is elucidated only if we 
consistently bear in mind the Christian roots and correlations of the given 
psychological situation. The cultural and social explication lies in non-
doing, the refusal to participate actively in existence, not only on its 
societal surface but also in its ontological depths. “Do not love the world 
nor that which is in it” might be the most appropriate Christian formula to 
describe this relation to the world. 
It is difficult to recall any example of a positive, active protagonist in 
Russian classical literature. If we begin once more with Pushkin, the only 
character who readily comes to mind is Pugachev in The Captain’s 
Daughter, who, while certainly active and perhaps even positive (at any 
rate, not without a certain rougish charm), could certainly never be called 
cultured. Lermontov’s Pechorin is active -- and even enjoys considerable 
success with the ladies--yet this is the pointless activity of a Byronian 
hero, who experiments with people and circumstances. Pechorin is 
extraneous among the extraneous people (and if we follow the 
psychoanalytical train of thought, we cannot help but notice both in the 
character and in Lermontov himself distinctly homosexual traits, 
particularly in their contempt for women). Curiously, perhaps the only 
active hero in Russian literature is not Russian at all, but German; this is 
Stoltz, whom Olga chooses over the “scout” Oblomov. Far more 
frequently, however, such active foreigners appear ridiculous; thus we 
have Hugo Pectoralis, the hero of Leskov’s “Mighty Wave,” who decides to 
best the Russians at their favorite sport -- overeating at the Easter meal -
- and dies after choking on a pancake. A similar plot appears in one of 
Chekhov’s early humorous tales, in which a foreigner marvels in terror, 
watching Russians partake of this same activity; this tale is called “The 
Foolish Frenchman.” Yet the most foolish Frenchman in all of Russian 
literature turns out to be Napoleon in Tolstoy’s War and Peace; the author 
satirically mocks and morally condemns the French emperor’s confidence 
in his own, human ability to influence events and make history. Kutuzov 
defeats him specifically by “non-doing,” by obedient faith in the 
mysterious flow of events which does not answer to man’s will. 
Further inspection of this motif in Russian literature yields an incredible 
result -- it becomes all the more evident during the Soviet period, when it 
would seem that Russian life had changed radically at its very core and 
had specifically undertaken stern measures to root out all ties with its 
religious, Christian past. 
Soviet literature began with a paradox -- Alexander Blok’s poem “The 
Twelve,” in which Christ steps forward as the leader of the Bolshevik Red 
Guards. The number twelve represented the new apostles in the new 
Bolshevik church. In his notes about the poem, Blok himself wrote that 
the Red Guard was a poor rural church adrift on the coarse ocean of 
Russian life. The poem pivots around the killing of the prostitute Katya, 
who symbolizes Russia. Christ’s presence seems to sanction this ritual 
murder. That a woman is killed draws a crucial thematic line linking Blok’s 
mysterious poem with the fundamental narrative of Russian literature. 
The Bolsheviks welcomed Blok, for they found the support of one of the 
pillars of pre-revolutionary Russia’s cultural elite both useful and 
flattering. However, they hurried to distance themselves from the poem’s 
Christ figure, pronouncing this motif “mysticism.” And in truth, both on 
the surface and in a practical sense, the aims of Bolshevism seemed to 
have little in common with the Russian cultural tradition as it was formed 
under Orthodox Christianity. Bolshevism entailed forced activism, a 
reorganized megalomania, a Promethean plan to reshape the world, which 
was by no means limited to social problems. It is a sort of cosmic utopia, 
like any truly revolutionary movement, as the Russian philosopher S. L. 
Frank noted in his remarkable work “The Heresy of Utopianism”: 
The last true source of utopian thought is a brand new—compared with 
the entire sphere of Old and New Testament conceptions--religious idea 
(the only possible analogue might be found in second-century gnosticism). 
This is the idea that all the world’s evil and human suffering are 
determined... by the faulty structure of the world itself. This brings up 
another thought: that human will, which is governed by the drive toward 
absolute truth, can fundamentally restructure the world, creating a new, 
meaningful, and righteous world in place of the old, successful, iniquitous 
one. Utopianism is...the rebellion of man’s moral will against the world’s 
creator and against the world itself as his creation. The ancient gnostics 
taught that the world was created by an evil god and that the God of love 
and righteousness, revealed in Christ, is an entirely different god from the 
world’s creator... Utopianism often admits openly its wish for cosmic 
transfiguration, as, for example, in Fourier’s utopian fantasies or in Marx’s 
famous formula about the ‘leap from the kingdom of necessity into the 
kingdom of freedom,’ which indicates the perception of imminent socialism 
precisely as an entirely new eon of universal being. In some foggy way 
utopianism cherishes the faith that transfiguring the social structure must 
somehow insure genuine salvation, that is, an end to man’s tragic 
subordination to the blind forces of nature and the coming of a new, 
unclouded and blissful existence.18 
The Christ portrayed in “The Twelve” is a gnostic Christ, bringing 
destruction to an unjust world embodied by a woman -- Katya. 
Contemporary cultural critic Alexander Etkind traces the further 
development of this theme in Blok’s work, concluding that castration is a 
necessary condition for the cosmic transfiguration of being. Blok’s Russian 
genius revealed Bolshevism’s secret as a Russian spiritual intention that 
was exclusively shaped by Christianity. The Bolsheviks’ decades-long 
struggle to eradicate the very essence of Russian being might and should 
be interpreted as the result of this fundamental spiritual arrangement. 
I refer, of course, to the mysticism of Russian literary and historical 
themes, not to their (Soviet) empiricism. The empiricism seemed new, yet 
beneath the surface of almost every Soviet literary framework one could 
trace this same narrative. A few examples: 
During the Soviet period, Russian literature began to assimilate themes 
and forms which had not been endemic to Russian classicism or to Russian 
literature generally. A certain secularity overtook Russian literature, 
partially in response to a common perception of the communist revolution 
as a radical attempt to Westernize Russian life. In this sense, the most 
interesting phenomenon might be seen as the emergence in the early 
1920s of the literary group “Serapion’s Brothers,” whose most famous 
member was Mikhail Zoschenko. The group’s manifesto, written by Lev 
Lunets, was unambiguously titled “Westward!” This manifesto proclaimed 
that the critical drawback to all previous Russian literature rested in its 
lack of plot, of that engaging action so characteristic of Western literature. 
This implicitly disavowed the introspective and overanalytical Russian 
literary hero, who had been, as previously discussed, a variation on the 
Christian consciousness. 
Like all independent literary groups in the post-revolutionary Soviet Union, 
“Serapion’s Brothers” did not last long and exerted no lasting influence on 
Russian literature. The very idea of a disengaged, aesthetically 
autonomous literature would not take root in Russian soil, even among the 
literary avant-garde. One might consider, for example, the literary group 
LEF, led by the famous poet Mayakovsky. Here the Bolshevik motif of 
Promethean activism resounded mightily. LEF proclaimed the end of art as 
a purely aesthetic activity and the transition to “life-building.” Art’s task 
was to shape a new, communist way of life. Applied art was touted as the 
acme of creativity -- for instance, the construction of economical fold-out 
furniture in response to the Soviet housing crisis.19 Yet at the same time, 
this fascination with applied art did not lie at the heart of LEF’s creative 
ideology. The secret goal was cosmic utopianism, the total transfiguration 
of being. This became most evident in Mayakovsky’s own, immensely 
creative work. The first edition of his poem “About This” included 
photomontages by A. Rodchenko, which were quite well-known in the 
West. The poem dealt with conquering love as earthly slavery, dreams of 
a new immortality, the thirst for physical resurrection. Here we find, 
transformed, motifs endemic to the most truly Christian worldview, but 
presented in a new, activist voice, as a sort of “pro-active apocalypse” (as 
N. Berdiaev remarked of Nikolai Fiodorov’s philosophy, which greatly 
influenced Mayakovsky). Significantly, overcoming the trappings of 
physical love as a form of cosmic, ontological survival echoes Christianity 
(if one ignores Plato, of course). The communist arose as a transformed, 
militant monk of the European middle ages, as opposed to the pensive, 
prayerful hermits of Orthodoxy; this was, essentially, the extent of the 
“radical change” and progress wrought by the Bolshevik revolution. I 
would hazard to say that this revolution took place within that same -- 
Christian -- discourse. 
Of course, I refer to the inner, truly unconscious implication of the 
revolution’s narratives. On the ideological surface, official doctrine did not 
and could not sustain such narratives. After all of the peripatetics of the 
shaky 1920s, official ideology proclaimed “socialist realism” as the only 
valid method for Soviet art. Art had to reflect life in its revolutionary 
progression, from a communist perspective. This doctrine emerged thanks 
in part to Maxim Gorky, who was an interesting figure in himself. Having 
achieved worldwide renown even before the revolution, Maxim Gorky 
(1868-1936) always nurtured socialist sympathies and political affiliations 
with the Bolsheviks. Prior to the revolution, he became active in a group 
called the “God-builders,” whom American scholar Robert Williams 
considers the real, or “other” Bolsheviks.20 They parted ways ideologically 
with Lenin on nothing less than interpretation of Marxist theory, correctly 
emphasizing its activist character while Lenin, at least before the 
revolution, saw Marxism through the traditional lens of harsh 
determinism, “economic materialism.” Among the God-builders, however, 
Marxism acquired a meaning beyond scientific theory explaining the laws 
of social evolution and became its own sort of religion, which allowed for 
global understanding and revealed the secrets of life. Marxism made 
possible the incarnation of the theogonic process: God becomes the 
people (the God-builders’ demotheism), that is, a social collective whose 
labor completely transfigures life itself. In other words, Marxism created a 
myth which inspired great masses of people to direct social action. Maxim 
Gorky wanted to see this myth realized in the process of socialist 
construction in the Soviet Union, and fixed his vision on the theory of 
“socialist realism.” In this view, both the subject and the object of art 
became reality itself, transformed through labor into the image of actual 
perfection. Socialist construction became a sort of theurgy. 
Social-realist methodology exerted the least influence over the artistic 
practice of Gorky himself, who was and remained a naturalist writer of the 
old school. However, it did not positively influence any other Soviet writer 
either, and in fact, could not do so. The theory was stillborn, for one 
cannot force any sort of theory or method on art. Yet social realism 
provides interesting evidence of the activist tendencies in Russian 
consciousness which cropped up in Bolshevik discourse. It is even more 
interesting to track these tendencies’ downfall. 
To make a long story short, one need recall only one name -- Andrei 
Platonov (1899-1951). This was a colossal figure, an undisputed Russian 
genius on a par with Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, the writer who reaffirmed 
Russian literature’s worldwide renown. Yet in the given context, his 
evolution is quite telling. 
The ideology, or rather the worldview of gnostic utopianism deeply 
permeated the young Platonov’s work in the form of Fiodorov-Tsiolkovsy’s 
cosmic fantasies. The main theme of Platonov’s writing in the early 1920s, 
when he was still writing poems and articles for a newspaper called The 
Voronezh Commune, was a profound hatred for the existing world and a 
call to its total destruction. These exhortations were technocratically 
motivated as a project to re-engineer existence completely. Platonov 
consciously quit the literary field and trained as an engineer -- specifically 
as an electrician and specialist in land improvement -- but on the job he 
encountered the impoverished reality of Russian life and realized that the 
matter at hand was not space missions to distant galaxies but digging 
ditches and rehydrating the soil in that same Voronezh county. Victor 
Shklovsky once encountered him on the job, and sketched a portrait of 
the young Platonov -- not the writer, but the agricultural engineer -- in his 
book The Third Factory. Platonov returned to literature a different man -- 
his theme of bold intergalactic adventures took on an unexpected, 
partially satirical twist (particularly in his projections to Russia’s past, to 
the era of Peter the Great, so similar to Bolshevik times, in “The 
Floodgates of Epiphany”), yet his rejection of the world and what was in it 
remained. Platonov became an extremely kenotic figure, one wants to say 
-- a Russian Christ. His prose evangelizes Russian apocalyptic nihilism. 
Platonov depicted faithful communists in the familiar guise of wandering 
pilgrims seeking the Invisible City, which is revealed to be communism. 
Most often, the Invisible City turns out deadly. Platonov’s protagonists 
seek death as a pledge of immortality (this theme also resonates in 
Pushkin’s work), as a path to a new heaven and a new earth. Death as a 
way of life-- here is Platonov’s theme. His heroes thirst to “live a little in 
death.” Yet Platonov himself remains immortal in Russia, his work 
presenting communism as the Russian apocalypse in the brilliant 
novels Chevengur and Kotlovan. 
Platonov conceived communism as a Christian phenomenon in the kenotic 
sense, as a rejection of all hustle and activity, total humility, the ultimate 
cultural nihilism. He simultaneously separated communism from forced 
activism and reinstated its basic rejection of the world. The circle of 
Russian culture and Russian literature closed in on itself; communism 
coincided in its secret sources with the purely Christian, culturally 
uncomplicated formation of the Russian Orthodox soul. This junction 
fulfilled the Christian cultural theme in Russia. Beyond this theme one 
finds only empiricism, which, for all its curiosity, has no specifically 
Russian essence. Russian literature past, present, and future which falls 
outside the bounds of Christian inspiration and negation was, is, and will 
always be as “international” as, say, technical craftsmanship. It involves 
integration and convergence, rather than any particular singularity. It is, 
in short, “not Russian.” 
Of course, Russian literature did and continues to harbor artists who 
struggled to stay out of this apocalyptic-nihilist ring, who broke free from 
it, or who simply never noticed it to begin with. Russian literature had its 
“Westerners.” Even Pushkin might be counted among them; despite his 
intimate penetration of specifically Russian themes, he remained “not 
Russian” (in the aforementioned sense) as a spiritual type--the type of an 
enlightened, open-minded European. Dmitri Merezhkovsky did not 
challenge Pushkin’s “Russianness” in vain when he energetically insisted 
that all Russian literature that followed Pushkin was an uninterrupted 
revolt against its forefather and first genius. Turgenev retains a similar 
superficially cultural image, despite his thorough development of the 
Russian-Christian “scout” prototype, the passive protagonist (Turgenev’s 
only revolutionary character was a Bulgarian in the novel The Day Before). 
Chekhov could also be described as European, in a more fascinating, 
democratically inclusive sense. One might also include here a whole series 
of 1920s poets -- Viazemsky, Baratynsky, Annensky. There is even a 
modern poet in Soviet and post-Soviet literature, Alexander Kushner, of 
whom a critic wrote: “What a rare case -- poetic inspiration at a 
temperature of 36.6 (Celsius).”21 The Western, un- (or anti-, or super-) 
Christian type of Russian writer, despite his indisputable accomplishments, 
remains marginal to Russian literature itself-- he cannot stand out as a 
genius against its background. 
Vasilii Rozanov once wrote that a Russian Westerner, as opposed to a 
Slavophile, would brilliantly edit, produce, annotate, and culturally 
contextualizeWar and Peace -- but he could never write it. Russian 
literature’s fate -- the fate of all Russian culture, if you will -- lies among 
these doomed geniuses in an environment lacking any true cultural middle 
ground. Culture as the “middle kingdom” is, once again, not Russian. 
Bertoldt Brecht’s famous words, “Pity the country that lacks heroes,” may 
well be applied to a country which engenders only geniuses. 
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